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Abstract 
 
This study examines policy tools in the fight against terrorism when existing levels of 
terrorism matter in 53 African countries for the period 1998-2012. The empirical evidence is 
based on contemporary, non-contemporary and Instrumental Variable Quantile regressions 
(QR) which enable the investigation throughout the conditional distributions of domestic, 
transnational and total terrorism dynamics. The following findings are established. First, 
counterterrorism policy instruments of inclusive human development and military expenditure 
further fuel terrorim. Second, political stability negatively affects terrorism with a negative 
threshold effect. Political stability estimates are consistently significant with increasing 
negative magnitudes throughout the conditional distributions of domestic and total terrorism. 
Policy implications are discussed.   
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1. Introduction 
The study aims to answer the following research question: how do inclusive development, 
military expenditure and political stability affect terrorism when existing levels of terrorism 
are taken into account in Africa? Africa has been developing at a fast pace with increase in 
human development, economic might and military capability. We would expect a proportional 
decrease in political violence. However, that is not the case. Investigating policy tools in the 
fight against terrorism by accounting for existing levels of terrorism is motivated by at least 
six contemporary factors, notably: increasing terrorism in Africa; the continent’s poverty 
tragedy; debates surrounding the effect human development and poverty on terrorism; 
controversies on the role of political governance on terrorism; debates on the effect of military 
expenditure on terrorism and shortcomings in the literature. The highlighted factors are 
engaged in chronological order.  
 First, terrorism is increasing in Africa because of endemic corruption, failure of states; 
plundering of resources; ethnic and tribal tensions and; religious fundamentalism (Fazel, 
2013; Alfa-Wali et al., 2015; Asongu et al., 2018, 2019). Despite the increasing concern about 
terrorism on the continent, compared to the Middle East, Africa is not receiving the policy and 
scholarly attention it deserves (Clavarino, 2014).  Notable terrorism organisations that have 
been disrupting livelihoods include: Al-Shabab in Somalia; Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
and the Boko Haram in Nigeria. According to the recently published Global Terrorism Index 
(GTI, 2014), compared to the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) which accounted for 6, 
073 deaths, the Boko Haram of Nigeria was the deadliest movement with 6,644 casualties.  
This study employs four main terrorism variables to assess the rising trends, namely: 
domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics.  
 Second, a World Bank report in April 2015 has revealed that extreme poverty has been 
decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of Africa, where 45% of states in 
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sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are considerably off-track for reaching the Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) extreme poverty target (Tchamyou, 2019, 2020; Tchamyou et al., 
2019; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019a, 2019b). Conversely, since the mid 1990s, the continent 
has been enjoying resurgence in economic growth (Fosu, 2015a, p. 44). The stark contrast 
between high growth and substantial off-track from the MDG poverty target does not augur 
well with overly optimistic perspectives about the ‘Africa rising’ narrative (Leautier, 2012; 
Pinkivskiy & Sala-i-Martin, 2014). There is a new stream of literature in response to the 
poverty tragedy of the continent. Some notable works include: (i) an assessment of whether 
the recent growth resurgence has been a myth or a reality on the one hand and investigating 
the role of institutions in the underlying growth resurgence, on the other (Fosu, 2015b, 
2015c). (ii) A paradigm shift to ‘soft economics’ (or human development) in order to 
understand Africa’s poverty tragedy (Kuada, 2015; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019c). The 
inequality adjusted human development index is used as a policy independent variable in this 
study.  
Third, empirical literature on the impact of human development and poverty on 
terrorism is mixed at best. Some conflicting conclusions include: no relationship between 
GDP per capita and terrorism (Krueger & Maleckova, 2003); a negative nexus between GDP 
per capita and terrorism (Li, 2005); no causality from the human development index to 
terrorism (Piazza, 2006); the risk of terrorism not more likely in poor countries (Abadie, 
2006); political repression (instead of GDP per capita) encouraging transnational terrorism 
(Krueger & Laitin, 2008); a positive nexus  between GDP per capita and terrorism when 
victims’ perspectives are taken into account (Gassenbner & Luechinger, 2011); minority 
economic discrimination positively affecting domestic terrorism  (Piazza, 2011) and a positive 
nexus between transnational terrorism and  GDP per capita (Blomberg et al., 2014). With the 
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exceptions of Piazza (2011) and Li and Schaub (2004), very little empirical support for the 
positive relationship between terrorism and poverty has been established.  
 Fourth, the literature is also very conflicting about the relationship between 
governance and terrorism (Lee, 2013).  On the one hand, there is a strand which argues that 
good institutions reduce negative sentiments towards a country and hence, mitigate the 
likelihood of terrorists organisations recruiting more activists (Windsor, 2003; Li, 2005). On 
the other hand, another strand of the literature contends that good governance is not a useful 
tool in mitigating terrorism because the interest of terrorists’ entities may not be properly 
represented by democratic political institutions (Gause, 2005). According to the narrative, 
states with strong political institutions are characterised by exclusive development (Bass, 
2014). To put this point into perspective, Western-born and -educated youth are leaving 
Europe to join the ranks of ISIL partly because they feel socio-economically excluded in 
countries they consider theirs (Foster, 2014). Terrorism is entertained in states with strong 
political governance because of a plethora of direct and indirect factors that are linked to a 
favourable environment and grievances, namely: access and freedom to media; freedom of 
speech in the expressions of disagreement and dissatisfaction and; civil liberties (Ross, 1993). 
A political governance indicator is used by this study to assess the governance-terrorism 
nexus in Africa.  
 Fifth, conflicting perspectives also exist in the literature on the impact of military 
expenditure on terrorism. There is consensus in the literature on the fact that military spending 
does not reduce terrorism (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010, p.195). The intuition for a negative 
relationship is not supported by empirical literature because military tools often tend to be 
counterproductive. Counterterrorism policies, instead of preventing terrorists’ attacks, further 
provoke them (Sandler, 2005) and the lack of internationally recognised common long-run 
and comprehensive policies in the fight against terrorism also renders counterterrorism 
6 
 
policies ineffective (Omand, 2005).  Moreover, measures towards fighting terrorism adopted 
by the United States are ineffective because they instead increase the likelihood that terrorism 
may reoccur (Lum et al., 2006). There is unidirectional relationship from terrorism to military 
spending (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010). Hence, the intuition that military expenditure can 
mitigate terrorism still has to be substantiated with empirical validity. We steer clear of the 
engaged literature by investigating the effect of military expenditure on terrorism while 
accounting for initial levels of terrorism.  
 Sixth, noticeably, the above literature leaves room for improvement in three main 
areas, namely, the need to: (i) focus on Africa which has not received the deserved scholarly 
attention despite rising levels of terrorism on the continent; (ii) contribute to the debate on the 
conflicting roles of political governance, inclusive development and military expenditure and 
(iii) assess the underlying nexuses using an alternative methodology.  For the purpose of 
avoiding repetition, we put only the first and third points into greater perspective. 
 African-specific literature on the fight against terrorism has been oriented for the most 
part towards: investigating the influence of poverty and freedoms on terrorism (Barros et al., 
2008); exploring the role of multilateral institutions (e.g. the African Union) on terrorism 
(Ewi & Aning, 2006); examining the influence of competition in military companies on the 
speed at which conflicts are brought to a swift end (Akcinaroglu  & Radziszewski,  2013) and 
investigating the role of externalities like geopolitical fluctuations (Straus, 2012).  
On the methodological front, previous literature on fighting terrorism has focused 
substantially on employing Ordinary Least Squares (Tavares, 2004; Bravo & Dias, 2006); 
Negative Binomial and Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Regressions  (Drakos & Gofas, 
2006; Savun & Phillips, 2009); logistic regression (Kavanagh, 2011; Bhavani, 2011);  the 
multilevel Poisson model (Lee, 2013) and Generalized Method of Moments (Bandyopadhyay 
et al., 2014). Our empirical approach has two main distinctive features. On the one hand, 
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contrary to highlighted studies (based on OLS and logistic regressions for example), the study 
controls for endogeneity by employing non-contemporary and instrumental variable 
regressions because Krieger and Meierrieks (2015) have recently documented that it is 
difficult to establish expected signs of policy variables without accounting for endogeneity 
with an instrumental variable approach. On the other hand, terrorism dynamics are regressed 
on policy variables throughout the conditional distributions of terrorism dynamics. Hence, 
comparative emphasis is placed on countries with low, intermediate and high levels of 
terrorism. The policy relevance of accounting for initial levels of terrorism in the modelling 
exercise is that blanket policies are unlikely to be effective unless they are contingent on 
initial levels of terrorism and tailored differently across countries with low, intermediate and 
high levels of terrorism.  
 The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the extant 
theoretical and empirical literature. The data and methodology are covered in Section 3. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results, discussion and policy implications while Section 5 
concludes with future directions. 
 
2. Theoretical and empirical literature   
2.1 Linkage between military expenditure and terrorism  
 There are two principal scenarios on the relationship between military expenditure and 
terrorism (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010). On the one hand, from intuition, terrorism increases 
military spending because more defense budget is allocated in response to increasing 
terrorism. It follows that if military spending is the variable to be explained, a positive nexus 
is expected. On the other hand, growing spending in the military is also expected to reduce 
terrorism, assuming that policies on boosting military spending are motivated by the 
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imperative of fighting terrorism. Hence, from an intuitive perspective, defense spending and 
terrorism reflect a negative relationship when the latter is the variable to be explained.  
 
2. 2 Linkage between political governance/stability and terrorism 
 The extant literature substantiating the nexus between political governance and 
terrorism can be engaged in three main strands, notably, the: relationship between political 
governance and domestic terrorism; linkage between political governance and transnational 
terrorism and debate underlying the governance-terrorism relationship (Asongu et al., 2018, 
2019).  
 First, underpinnings on the nexus between political governance and domestic terrorism 
are motivated by the perspective that citizens of the state have various incentives to use 
political violence and radical mechanisms against prevailing institutions or established 
governments, political figures and other nationals (Choi, 2010). According to the narrative, 
three main scenarios may motivate the resort to violence, namely: (i) grievances from 
citizens; (ii) evolving desperation and hopelessness with no available peaceful channels by 
which underlying grievances can be settled and (iii) nationals thinking that the employment of 
terror tactics is viable as well as legitimate in communicating their grievances, frustrations 
and anger. Behind this underpinning is the logic that, in so far as citizens have peaceful 
channels by which conflicts can be resolved at their disposal, options of terrorism are less 
likely to be considered as means to conflict settlement. This is consistent with some studies 
which have established that “weakly institutionalized” or “immature” democracies with less 
institutionalized minority protection and substantial violations in human rights create a 
favorable environment for terrorism (Gaibulloev  et al., 2017). In the light of this postulation, 
we expect countries with better political governance to be less affected by terrorism because 
they offer peaceful mechanisms for the settlement of politico-economic scores. It is also 
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relevant to note that some studies focusing on the nexus between democracy and terrorism 
have argued that the underlying relationship can be contingent on other characteristics such as 
territorial conflict and minority discrimination (Chenoweth, 2013; Ghatak et al., 2019). 
 Second, the connection between political governance and transnational terrorism is 
based on the view that good political institutions consolidate the legitimacy of democratic 
systems which provide an enabling environment for the protection of both foreign and 
domestic citizens. Moreover, societies endowed with better political governance also provide 
nonviolent channels for the resolution of conflicts (Choi, 2010). Hence, as maintained by 
Asongu et al. (2018, 2019), the likelihood for transnational terrorism can be curtailed by the 
availability of political institutions because political governance offers free and fair 
democratic means for the election and replacement of political leaders. Hence, in an 
environment of political stability, violence and terrorism as means to the settlement of scores 
are less likely.  
 Third, conflicting views have emerged in the literature on the linkage between 
governance and terrorism.  On the one hand, a first stream of studies is more optimistic about 
the nexus between political governance and terrorism. For example, the political access theory 
(Eyerman, 1998) postulates that compared to weak democracies, states that enjoy strong 
democracies are more immune to terrorism. Some institutional facilities that provide strong 
democracies with comparatively more immunity to terrorism are: respect of the rule of law 
(Choi, 2010) and judicial independence (Findley & Young, 2011). In a nutshell, democratic 
institutions endow citizens with channels by and avenues of which their grievances can be 
voiced and settled nonviolently (Li, 2005). 
 On the other hand, regime-based differences either between or within states can be 
exploited for violent opportunities (Hoffman et al., 2013).  Whereas autocracies are usually 
thought to be characterized by less political governance, strong autocracies on the contrary are 
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endowed with relatively more political stability. Emphasis on stable autocracies is motivated 
by the view that failing or failed states find it hard to control terrorism. This perspective is in 
accordance with a broad stream of literature devoted to the subject: Schmid (1992); Eubank 
and Weinberg (1994); Drakos and Gofas (2006); Piazza (2007); Lai (2007) and Piazza 
(2008a). According to the narrative, citizens in democracies are endowed with certain features 
that provide a favorable environment for terrorism and/or resort to violence. This is logical in 
the perspective that strong democracies endow citizens with liberties to engage politico-
economically without much government interference.  
 In summary, there are two principal competing effects from political institutions on 
terrorism (Li, 2005; Asongu et al., 2018, 2019). On the one hand, transnational terrorism can 
be greased by political deadlock in checks and balances as well as constraints in government 
structures and procedures. On the other hand, participative democracy mitigates the likelihood 
for transnational terrorism (Asongu et al., 2018, 2019). From an empirical standpoint, there is 
an abundant supply of literature documenting the positive nexus between terrorism and 
democracy (Lee, 2013; Weinberg & Eubank, 1998; Eubank & Weinberg, 1994, 2001; Piazza, 
2007, 2008b). It is also possible to boost terrorism by means of competition in environments 
with strong political governance (Chenoweth, 2010).  
 
 
2.3 Linkage between inclusive development and terrorism 
 Linkages between inclusive development and terrorism can be classified in three main 
categories. First, the theory of relative deprivation developed by Gurr (1970) documents some 
interesting insights into the relationship between exclusive development and political violence 
(Krieger & Meierrieks, 2015; Asongu et al., 2018).  Considering that ‘relative deprivation’ 
can be defined as “individuals’ expectations of economic or political goods exceed the actual 
distribution of those goods” (Piazza, 2006, p.162), the theory “is grounded in the assumption 
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that people who engage in rebellious political behavior are motivated principally by anger 
resulting from […] relative deprivation” (Muller & Weede, 1994, p. 40). It follows that 
capture by the elite of state resources (which is more likely in autocracies) can boost 
discontent and frustration over exclusive development and hence lead to political violence and 
aggression. Accordingly, in scenarios of relative deprivation, the marginalized and/or poor 
can resort to violent means of making their voices heard. Furthermore, microeconomic 
literature also accords with the perspective that exclusive development factors (e.g. poverty, 
unemployment and inequality) have provided terrorists’ organizations with an opportunity of 
recruiting more skilled personnel (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005; Benmelech et al., 2012).  
 Second, as maintained by Asongu et al. (2018), while the absence of inclusive 
development is directly related to terrorism due to frustration and deprivation, exclusive 
development could also cause terrorism indirectly by deteriorating social conditions. For 
instance, limited politico-economic and socio-economic development can further grease 
terrorism. (1) The perspective of politico-economic participation revolves around the political 
influence of social groups in shaping institutions for distribution within society and access by 
social groups to resources (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2015). Within a framework where power is 
held by a few people, these can mobilize enough resources with which to create and/or 
consolidate politico-economic institutions that promote and protect their vested interests. In 
response, unhappy citizens at lower levels of the socio-economic ladder could use violence as 
means to changing the status quo or existing institutional order. Usage of terror tactics in the 
demand for greater politico-economic participation is increasingly being documented in the 
literature (Basuchoudhary &  Shughart, 2010; Gassebner & Luechinger, 2011). (2) A number 
of socio-economic consequences have been established to result from inequality. For instance: 
Fosu (2008, 2009, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c) has shown that: (i) inequality reduces the 
accumulation of human capital which eventually affects growth and (ii) the response of 
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poverty to growth is a decreasing function of socio-economic inequality. Therefore, inequality 
is a potential cause of terrorism. The socio-economic narrative is in accordance with recent 
empirical literature maintaining that deteriorating socio-economic conditions fuel the 
employment of violence by citizens to communicate their grievances (Freytag et al., 2011; 
Gries et al., 2011; Caruso & Schneider, 2011).  It is also worthwhile to note that some studies 
(e.g.  De la Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca, 2012) have established an inverted U-shape nexus 
between economic prosperity and terrorism.  
 Third, despite the engaged background, there is still some very conflicting evidence on 
the relationship between political violence (or terrorism) and exclusive development (Asongu 
et al., 2018). (1) There is yet no firmly established consensus on the relationship between 
inequality and civil wars “Over the past few years, prominent large-N studies of civil war 
seem to have reached a consensus that inequality does not increase the risk of civil war” 
(Østby, 2008, p. 143). Still, some studies maintain that civil wars are more likely in countries 
that are characterized by high inequality (Cederman et al., 2011; Baten & Mumme, 2013; 
Krieger & Meierrieks, 2015). (2) As concerns the relationship between terrorism and 
inequality, empirical evidence is also very conflicting. While a stream of the literature does 
not establish a clear link between inequality and terrorism (Li, 2005; Abadie, 2006; Piazza, 
2006), another stream of studies maintains that inequality strongly causes terrorism (Piazza, 
2011; 2013). As to linkages between domestic versus transnational terrorism and inequality, 
whereas domestic terrorism is substantially influenced by economic grievances (Piazza, 
2013), transnational terrorism is fundamentally motivated by grievances pertaining to the 
foreign policy of rich democracies (Savun & Phillips, 2009). 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
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 The study examines a sample of 53 African countries with data for the period 1996-
2012. There are three main data sources, notably: (i) the Global Terrorism Database; (ii) 
World Governance Indicators and African Development Indicators of the World Bank and 
(iii) updated terrorism dynamics from Enders et al. (2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012). The 
sample’s periodicity is motivated by constraints in data availability. We articulate these 
constraints in three points. The transformation of terrorism variables by Gailbulloev et al. 
(2012) into domestic, transnational, unclear and total dynamics is up to the year 2012. 
Macroeconomic indicators from African Development Indicators are not available before the 
year 2012. 1996 is the starting year because good governance variables from the World Bank 
are not available before this year. For the purpose of remaining consistent with Asongu et al. 
(2018), the periodicity starts from the year 1998.  
Terrorism is defined in this study as the actual and threatened use of force by 
subnational actors with the purpose of employing intimidation to meet political objectives 
(Enders & Sandler, 2006). The study uses four distinct but related dependent variables: 
domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism variables. Terrorism is measured in terms 
of the number of terrorist incidents registered by a given country yearly. In order to avoid 
concerns related to the positive skew and log transformation of zeros, the data is improved by 
adding one to the base before taking natural logarithms of the terrorism incidents. Choi and 
Salehyan (2013),  Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014), Efobi and Asongu (2016)  and Asongu and 
Nwachukwu (2017a) have recently adopted the same transformation procedure.  
Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015, p. 6). Domestic terrorism 
“includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involves the nationals of the venue country: 
implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters are all from the venue 
country” (p.6). Transnational terrorism is  “ terrorism including those acts of terrorism that 
concerns at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, supporters and incidence 
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may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is from another”.  Unclear terrorism is 
that, “which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can neither be defined as domestic nor 
transnational terrorism” (p.6). Total terrorism is the sum of domestic, transnational and 
unclear terrorism dynamics.  
 Three main independent variables of interest are used, namely: inclusive human 
development, military expenditure and political stability. Consistent with Asongu et al. 
(2019), these indicators are expected to negatively affect terrorism. There is a growing stream 
of the literature maintaining that, adherence to and sympathy for organisations propagating 
terrorism is fundamentally traceable to a feeling of exclusive development (Bass, 2014).  This 
narrative has been confirmed by Foster (2014) who maintains that a prime motivation of 
Western-educated youth joining terrorist organisations like ISIL is a feeling of socio-
economic exclusion. In essence, Western-born candidates fleeing to the Middle East to join 
ISIL have the feeling of being treated as foreigners in countries they have considered as theirs 
from birth. Tonwe and Eke (2013) concur with the narrative on exclusive development by 
emphasising that a remote cause of the growing Boko Haram in Nigeria is partly because the 
Northern region is less developed when compared with the more prosperous Southern part of 
the country. In accordance with recent African development literature (Asongu et al., 2015a), 
the inequality adjusted human development index (IHDI) is used as the indicator of inclusive 
development. There is also an interesting stream of literature documenting the importance of 
military expenditure in fighting terrorism (Sandler, 2005; Lum et al., 2006; Feridum & 
Shahbaz, 2010). The comparative relevance of political stability in relation to other 
governance indicators has already been established by Asongu et al. (2018). In essence, the 
authors have consistently found the political stability variable to be the most significant in 
deterring dynamics of terrorism.  
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 Three control variables are selected to account for bias in omitted variables, namely: 
internet penetration, inflation and economic growth. First, the internet has become a viable 
tool for recruiting and coordinating terrorist activities (Argomaniz, 2015; Holbrook, 2015).  
Second, high (low) inflation has been established to be linked with the likelihood for more 
(less) socio-economic protests and political strife (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a, 2018).  
According to the narrative, chaotic inflation portrays a gloomy economic outlook and 
decreases the purchasing power of citizens. These may be associated with other factors that 
are very likely to fuel socio-political unrests, namely: low investment, high unemployment 
and low economic growth.  
Third, there is empirical evidence supporting the view that economic growth could 
reduce the likelihood for terrorism because it provides: (i) opportunities for jobs and social 
amenities on the one hand and (ii) financial resources essential for the prevention of and fight 
against terrorism, on the other. The intuition is supported by Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) 
who have shown that low-income countries are less likely to assuage negative economic 
externalities from terrorists’ activities. This is not the case with high-income nations which 
are endowed with more financial resources needed to absorb terrorism shocks without 
substantial negative development externalities.  
 The correlation matrix, summary statistics and definitions (with sources) of variables 
are disclosed respectively in Appendix 3, Appendix 2 and Appendix 1. Two points are worth 
emphasizing from the summary statistics: (i) mean values are comparable and (ii) from 
corresponding standard deviations, we can be confident that reasonable estimated linkages 
would emerge.  The objective of the correlation matrix is to control for potential concerns of 
multicollinearity. An initial assessment reveals that underlying issues about high degrees of 
substitution are exclusively noticeable among terrorism indicators. These concerns are less 
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likely to bias estimations because terrorism indicators are employed essentially as dependent 
variables in distinct specifications.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 In order to examine whether existing levels of terrorism matter in the fight against 
terrorism,  the study is consistent with the literature on conditional determinants by employing 
a quantile regressions (QR) approach which investigates factors that fuel and/or mitigate a 
given dependent variable (Keonker & Hallock, 2001; Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & 
Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2013). In essence, the QR method consists of examining the 
determinants of terrorism throughout the conditional distributions of terrorism (Asongu and 
Nwachukwu, 2016b).  
 To the best of our knowledge, the existing terrorism literature has focused on 
examining the determinations of the dependent variable at the conditional mean of terrorism 
(Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014). Whereas mean impacts are important, we extend the 
underlying literature by employing an estimation technique that accounts for existing levels of 
terrorism. Moreover, terrorism studies emphasising mean effects by Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) are based on the assumption that the error terms are normally distributed (Tavares, 
2004; Bravo & Dias, 2006). This assumption does not hold for the QR approach because the 
technique is not based on the assumption of normally distributed error terms (Asongu & 
Odhiambo, 2019d). Therefore, the approach enables this study to assess determinants of 
terrorism with specific emphasis on countries with low, intermediate and high levels of 
terrorism. This  technique which is robust in the presence of outliers enables the assessment of 
parameter estimates are multiple points of the conditional distribution of terrorism (Koenker 
& Bassett, 1978).  
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 As far as we have reviewed, the scarce terrorism literature employing QR (see Asongu 
et al., 2015b) has failed to account for endogeneity. We address the concern by extending 
baseline contemporary QR with non-contemporary QR and instrumental variable QR (IVQR). 
Accordingly, inclusive human development, military expenditure and political stability are 
instrumented respectively with Eq. (1), Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) below.  
  tittijti HH ,1,,   
 
                                                                    (1) 
  tittijti MM ,1,,                                                                        (2) 
  tittijti PP ,1,,                                                                            (3) 
Where: tiH , , is the inclusive human development indicator of country i
 
in  period t ,  tiM ,
 
denotes military expenditure, tiP ,
 
is political stability,  is a constant, t  is time specific 
constant, ti ,  the error term, 1, tiH , represents  inclusive human development  of country i
 
in  
period 1t  term, 1, tiM , denotes  military expenditure  of country i
 
in  period 1t  , 1, tiP , 
represents  political stability  of country i
 
in  period 1t . The instrumentation procedure 
consists of regressing the independent variables of interest on their first lags and then saving 
the fitted values that are subsequently used as the main independent variables in Eq. (4). The 
specifications are Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) in standard 
errors. The instrumentation procedure is consistent with recent literature (Asongu & 
Nwachukwu, 2017b). The  th quantile estimator of terrorism is obtained by solving for the 
following optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts for simplicity in Eq. 
(4) 
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where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For 
example, the 25th or 75th quantiles (with  =0.25 or 0.75 respectively) are assessed by 
approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of terrorism or iy given ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(  ,                                                                                                         (5) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at 
the mean of the conditional distribution of terrorism. For the model in Eq. (5), the dependent 
variable iy  is a terrorism indicator while ix  contains a constant term, inclusive development, 
military expenditure, political stability,  economic growth, inflation and internet penetration.  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Presentation of results  
Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 respectively present findings on domestic terrorism, 
transnational terrorism and total terrorism. Each of the tables is presented in three distinct 
sections, namely: contemporary, non-contemporary and instrumental variable regressions. 
Irrespective of tables, we notice substantial differences in terms of sign and magnitude of 
estimates from OLS and various quantiles. This justifies the choice of the estimation 
technique in the perspective that determinants of terrorism or policy tools for the fight against 
terrorism are contingent on initial levels of terrorism.  
The following findings can be established from Table 1 on domestic terrorism. (1)  
Inclusive development consistently has a positive effect on terrorism. (2) The impact of 
military expenditure is also positive with the significance most apparent in the top quantiles of 
the distributions. (3) Political stability negatively affects terrorism with a negative threshold 
effect. A negative threshold effect is established when there is a negative effect with 
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consistent increasing negative magnitude throughout the conditional distribution of terrorism 
or a positive effect with consistent decreasing positive magnitude throughout the conditional 
distribution of terrorism. (4) Most of the significant control variables have expected signs.  
With a slight exception at the 50th quantile of instrumental variable regressions in Table 2 on 
transnational terrorism, where the effect of military expenditure displays a negative sign, the 
findings in Tables 2-3 are consistent with those in Table 1.  
 
“Insert Tables 1-3 here” 
4.2 Further discussion and policy implications 
4.2.1 Nexus with the literture  
 The positive and insignificant effects of military expenditure are in accordance with 
the stream of the literature documenting that exclusive military measures are insufficient in 
fighting terrorism. Moreover, military counterterrorism initiatives may further fuel terrorism 
(see Sandler, 2005; Lum et al., 2006; Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010). 
 The insignficant and positive relationships betweeen inclusive human development 
and terrorism accord with the strand of the literature maintaining that economic and human 
developments either do not significantly affect terrorism or impact it negatively. This consists 
of literaure that has established: (i) no nexus between terrorism (and/or civil wars) and 
economic development (Piazza, 2006; Krueger & Maleckova, 2003; Østby, 2008, p. 143) and 
(ii) a positive relationship between terrorism and economic development (Gassenbner & 
Luechinger, 2011; Blomberg et al., 2014). In addition, the results are also not consistent with 
the stream of literature documenting the absence of a nexus between terrorism and inclusive 
development (Li, 2005; Abadie, 2006; Piazza, 2006).  
 With respect to political instability, the finding aligns with the stream of literature 
supportive of the appealing role of good governance in mitigating negative sentiments that 
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motivate terrorist organisations to recruit more workers and activities (see Windsor, 2003; Li, 
2005).  Therefore, the political access theory is confirmed, notably: on the comparative 
immunity of strong democracies to terrorism. Accordingly, political stability is likely to be 
strongly associated with variables from which similar relationships have been established in 
the literature, namely: judicial independence (Findley & Young, 2011) and the rule of law 
(Choi, 2010).  
 
4.2.2 Practical implications  
 Practical contributions are discussed on the unexpected signs. First, we have observed 
that whereas military expenditure is not significant in bottom quantiles, it is positively 
significant in top quantiles. This implies that military spending devoted to countering 
terrorism is not effective when existing levels of terrorism are low. Conversely, when existing 
levels of terrorism are high, employing a military means to combating terrorism is 
counterproductive because it only fuels terrorism.  
 The positive impact of inclusive development could imply that despite sampled 
countries’ efforts towards improving the equitable distribution  of fruits from economic 
development, the effects may be counterproductive due to frustrations from some circles that 
are not sympathetic with policies of equitable distribution of wealth because such policies  
negatively affect some vested interest.  Under this scenario, discontent and grievances over 
unequal distribution of national wealth is not from poor segments of the population, but from 
the elite situated in the middle- and upper-income strata, for the most part. Accordingly, the 
elite may be infuriated and concerned that more equitable income distribution is affecting 
them negatively. Within this framework, they can mobilise resources to fund violent activites 
which creates instability and opportunities for the elite to eventually reinvent and tailor 
existing institutions to the protection of their interests and rents.  
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 The above practical implication pertaining to inclusive human development is broadly 
consistent with the narratives of the African middle class which is an embodiment of an elite 
which is unsympathetic to demands for inclusive human development because of preferences 
to specific markets and dependence on state resources (see Poulton, 2014). Furthermore, the 
corresponding stream of literature maintains that a middle class in Africa is likely to skillfully  
hamper socio-economic transformations by employing tactics of external (e.g. terrorism) and 
internal (e.g. civil unrest/war) violence in order to retain a tight grip on governing institutions 
(see Poulton, 2014: Resnick, 2015). It follows from the discourse that the elite and middle 
class could coordinate activites that bring temporal unrest and chaos in order to reinvent and 
tailor  institutions to their tastes. The inference is contingent on the view that such frustrations 
from the middle class are for the most part linked to the elite with political connections, 
contrary to the elite and middle class which are improving their income and status from level-
playing activities like innovation, the market economy and free entreprising. The discussion is 
also consistent with the skepticism on the role the middle class in the continent might by 
playing in governance transformations (Rodrik, 2015). 
 
4.2.3 Threshold effect from political stability  
 It is important to devote space to discussing the effect of political stability in more 
depth because it is the only variable of interest with the expected sign. Accordingly, we have 
established that politiical stability negatively affects terrorism with a negative threshold 
effect. The political stability estimates are consistently significant with increasing negative 
magnitudes throughout the conditional distributions of domestic and total terrorism dynamics. 
In other words, the negative responsiveness of terrorism to political stability is a decreasing 
function of terrorism.  
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 There are a number of stylized facts that can elucidate the negative threshold from 
political stability. Political instability on the continent has been the main factor fueling the 
development of extremism and terrorism (see Clavarino, 2014). Terror movements are 
growing in scale and scope across the continent because of cross-border political instability 
for the most part. For instance, since the 2011 collapse of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in 
Libya, Islamic militancy and insurgencey have been growing steadily in the Sahel region. 
Moreover, the spectacular growth of Al-Shabaab in East Africa over the past decades was due 
to a failed central government of Somalia. 
 
5. Conclusion, caveats and further research directions  
This study has examined policy tools in the fight against terrorism when existing 
levels of terrorism matter in 53 African countries for the period 1998-2012. The empirical 
evidence is based on contemporary, non-contemporary and Instrumental Variable Quantile 
regressions (QR) which enable the investigation throughout the conditional distributions of 
domestic, transnational and total terrorism dyanmics. The policy relevance of the QR 
approach  builds on the motivation that blanket policies in the fight against terrorism may not 
be effective unless they are contigent on existing levels of terrorism and tailored differently 
across countries with low, intermediate and high levels of terrorism. The following findings 
are established. First, counterterrorism policy instruments of inclusive human development 
and military expenditure further fuel terrorim. Second, political stability negatively affects 
terrorism with a negative threshold effect. Political stability estimates are consistently 
significant with increasing negative magnitudes throughout the conditional distributions of 
domestic and total terrorism dynamics. In other words, the negative responsiveness of 
terrorism to political stability is a decreasing function of terrorism. Unexpected signs are 
elucidated and policy implications discussed.  
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The evidence that inclusive human development and military expenditure have 
unexpected signs implies that they may be necessary but not sufficient for the battle against 
terrorism. Moreover, their effectiveness may be contingent on their interaction with other 
macroeconomic and institutional variables. In the light of these considerations, future research 
could focus on investigating factors that can be complemented with military expenditure and 
inclusive human development in order to establish expected negative effects on terrorism. 
Moreover, due to data availability constraints, not all variables employed in the conflict 
literature are involved in the conditioning information set. Hence, it is worthwhile for further 
studies to include other variables such as population, discrimination/deprivation, regime type, 
intervention (for transnational terrorism) and civil conflict.  
 A caveat to this study is that the conclusions can be viewed as simplifying what is a 
rather complex phenomenon. Whereas the quantitative approach offers us a generalised view 
about terrorism and counter-terrorism policies in and towards Africa, what it does not offer is 
a nuanced perspective that some of the sampled countries are likely to present. For instance, 
while the study concludes that military expenditure fuels terrorism because of the 
overwhelming positive “military expenditure”-terrorism nexus, in some sparse quantiles, the 
opposite nexus is apparent. Hence, knowing why military expenditure may have a positive 
impact on domestic terrorism and a negative impact on transnational terrorism owing to initial 
conditions of terrorism could be the object of future research given the complexity of the 
phenomenon. Hence, the generalized view points of terrorism and counter-terrorism policies 
in and toward Africa could be examined further in future studies, in the light of the attendant 
caveats.  
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Table 1: Conditional effects on Domestic terrorism 
                   
 Dependent variable: Domestic Terrorism   
 
         
 Contemporary  Non Contemporary  Instrumental Variable  
 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Constant  0.046 -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.038*** 0.026 0.796*** 0.014 na na -0.023*** 0.040 0.270 0.106 -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.008 -0.018 0.559*** 
 (0.583) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.795) (0.000) (0.868)   (0.000) (0.696) (0.131) (0.239) (0.000) (0.000) (0.433) (0.815) (0.000) 
IHDI 0.036*** 0.024*** 0.024 0.053*** 0.051*** 0.034*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.680) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)             
IHDI (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.016 --- --- 0.027*** 0.039*** 0.028*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       (0.176)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
IHDI (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.030*** 0.043*** 0.029*** 
             (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Military  0.015 0.00006 -0.00006 0.005** 0.122*** 0.122*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.656) (0.667) (0.680) (0.031) (0.000) (0.001)             
Military (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.008 --- --- -0.00009 0.093*** 0.133** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       (0.796)   (0.919) (0.007) (0.022)       
Military(IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.022 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.002 0.105*** 0.150*** 
             (0.532) (0.114) (0.483) (0.479) (0.000) (0.002) 
PolSta -0.572*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.057*** -0.609*** 1.050*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)             
PolSta(-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.024*** --- --- -0.020*** -0.627*** -0.965*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       (0.024)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
PolSta(IV) --- --- --- --- --- ---       -0.592*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.074*** -0.614*** 1.009*** 
             (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet (1) 
or (-1) 
0.018*** -
0.00008**
* 
-0.0001 
*** 
0.001*** 0.022*** 0.036*** 0.024*** --- --- 0.0003** 0.035*** 0.069*** 0.021*** -0.00009 
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
0.001*** 0.033*** 0.050*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)   (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDPg (1) or 
(-1) 
-0.0002 0.00007 0.000005 0.0004 0.006 -0.037*** 0.009 --- --- 0.0007*** 0.004 0.015 -0.005 0.00008 0.00005 0.001 0.006 -0.030* 
 (0.982) (0.146) (0.929) (0.626) (0.542) (0.003) (0.350)   (0.007) (0.625) (0.264) (0.566) (0.130) (0.448) (0.225) (0.364) (0.063) 
Inflation (1) 
or (-1) 
-0.002*** 0.000006* -0.000 0.001*** -0.002*** -0.006*** -0.001* --- --- 0.001*** -0.001* -0.003*** -0.003*** 0.000005 -0.0000 -0.0003 
*** 
-0.003*** -0.006*** 
  (0.000) (0.050) (0.794) (0.000) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.063)   (0.000) (0.092) (0.000) (0.000) (0.155) (0.949) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
                   
Pseudo R²/R² 0.307 0.011 0.014 0.022 0.257 0.358 0.291 --- --- 0.003 0.245 0.365 0.326 0.009 0.012 0.018 0.272 0.375 
Fisher 23.08***      18.37***      20.69***      
Countries                    
Observations  471 471 471 471 471 471 431   431 431 431 402 402 402 402 402 402 
                   
Notes. Dependent variable is Domestic terrorism. *,**,***, denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where the Domestic terrorism is least. OLS: 
Ordinary Least Squares. Pseudo R²(R²) for Quantile regressions (OLS). na: not applicable because convergence is not achieved.  
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Table 2: Conditional effects on Transnational terrorism 
                   
 Dependent variable: Transnational  Terrorism   
 
         
 Contemporary  Non Contemporary  Instrumental Variable  
 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Constant  0.013 na na na 0.004 0.322*** 0.027 na na -0.014*** -0.012 0.405*** 0.099* na na -0.006*** 0.102 0.358*** 
 (0.785)    (0.940) (0.000) (0.635)   (0.000) (0.882) (0.007) (0.059)   (0.000) (0.141) (0.000) 
IHDI 0.006 --- --- --- 0.019*** 0.010*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.219)    (0.000) (0.000)             
IHDI (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.006 --- --- 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.009* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       (0.243)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.068)       
IHDI (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.009 --- --- 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.011*** 
             (0.117)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Military  -0.010 --- --- --- 0.044** 0.047* --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.621)    (0.035) (0.081)             
Military (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.017 --- --- 0.0004 0.032 0.030 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       (0.451)   (0.357) (0.232) (0.588)       
Military(IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.044** --- --- -0.0001* 0.003 0.039 
             (0.044)   (0.079) (0.886) (0.213) 
PolSta -0.305*** --- --- --- -0.331*** -0.560*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000)             
PolSta(-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.291*** --- --- -0.005*** -0.312*** -0.569*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
PolSta(IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---    -0.319*** --- --- -0.001*** -0.349*** -0.545*** 
             (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet(1) or 
(-1)  
0.007*** --- --- --- 0.007*** 0.019*** 0.008** --- --- 0.00003 0.008** 0.019** 0.007*** --- --- -0.00009*** 0.009*** 0.022*** 
 (0.005)    (0.001) (0.000) (0.011)   (0.653) (0.016) (0.019) (0.008)   (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
GDPg (1) or 
(-1) 
0.002 --- --- --- 0.002 -0.006 0.007 --- --- 0.0002 0.012 -0.006 -0.0001 --- --- 0.00005** 0.001 -0.011* 
 (0.605)    (0.631) (0.237) (0.228)   (0.140) (0.205) (0.659) (0.974)   (0.049) (0.775) (0.077) 
Inflation (1) 
or (-1) 
0.0008 --- --- --- 0.002*** 0.0006 0.0006 --- --- 0.001*** 0.0009* -0.001 -0.001*** --- --- -0.000002* -0.001*** -0.003*** 
  (0.564)    (0.000) (0.165) (0.228)   (0.000) (0.072) (0.102) (0.000)   (0.078) (0.000) (0.000) 
                   
Pseudo R²/R² 0.266    0.188 0.349 0.228 --- --- 0.0001 0.167 0.290 0.270 --- --- 0.004 0.178 0.353 
Fisher 16.22***      14.68***      13.86***      
Countries                    
Observations  471    471 471 431   431 431 431 402   402 402 402 
                   
Notes. Dependent variable is Transnational terrorism. *,**,***, denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where the Transnational  terrorism is least. OLS: 
Ordinary Least Squares. Pseudo R²(R²) for Quantile regressions (OLS). na: not applicable because convergence is not achieved.  
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Table 3: Conditional effects on Total terrorism 
                   
 Dependent variable: Total Terrorism   
 
         
 Contemporary  Non Contemporary  Instrumental Variable  
 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 OLS 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.90 
Constant  0.073 -0.015 
*** 
-0.013 
*** 
-0.120 
*** 
0.252* 0.888*** 0.059 na na -0.110** 0.170 0.854*** 0.173* -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.011 0.319** 0.728*** 
 (0.423) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.053) (0.000) (0.548) --- --- (0.034) (0.265) (0.000) (0.080) (0.000) (0.000) (0.826) (0.013) (0.000) 
IHDI 0.042*** 0.024**
* 
0.024**
* 
0.053**
* 
0.069*** 0.054*** ---   --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)             
IHDI (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.018 --- --- 0.041*** 0.046**
* 
0.032*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       (0.212)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
IHDI (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.043*** 0.028*** 
             (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Military  0.021 0.00008 0.0001 0.062 
*** 
0.084* 0.099*  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.540) (0.596) (0.333) (0.000) (0.055) (0.051)             
Military (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.003 --- --- 0.047*** 0.101** 0.050 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       (0.934)   (0.004) (0.045) (0.393)       
Military(IV) --- --- --- --- --- ---  --- ---    -0.029 0.00002 -0.0001 0.019 0.037 0.108* 
             (0.436) (0.918) (0.623) (0.276) (0.388) (0.086) 
PolSta -0.686*** -0.002 
*** 
-0.003 
*** 
-0.401 
*** 
-0.814*** -1.170***  --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)             
PolSta(-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.690 
*** 
--- --- -0.440*** -0.835 
*** 
-1.201*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
       (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
PolSta(IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---    -0.708*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.453*** -0.827*** -1.086*** 
             (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Internet (1) 
or (-1) 
0.019*** -
0.00008
*** 
-0.0001 
*** 
0.008**
* 
0.021*** 0.037*** 0.024**
* 
--- --- 0.011*** 0.030**
* 
0.048*** 0.022*** -0.00008 
*** 
-
0.0001*** 
0.010*** 0.032*** 0.066*** 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) --- --- (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDPg (1) or 
(-1) 
0.0004 0.00007 0.00003 0.009* -0.008 -0.033*** 0.009   0.012** 0.014 -0.012 -0.005 0.00007 0.00007 0.009* -0.011 -0.038** 
 (0.966) (0.248) (0.604) (0.055) (0.504) (0.001) (0.371) --- --- (0.019) (0.328) (0.335) (0.598) (0.286) (0.351) (0.070) (0.354) (0.034) 
Inflation (1) 
or (-1) 
-0.0009 0.00000
5 
0.00003
*** 
0.002**
* 
-0.0003 -0.003*** -0.0006   0.001*** -0.001 -0.004*** -0.003*** 0.000004 -0.000002 -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.007*** 
  (0.559) (0.248) (0.000) (0.000) (0.737) (0.000) (0.306) --- --- (0.002) (0.137) (0.000) (0.000) (0.267) (0.376) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
                   
Pseudo R²/R² 0.366 0.009 0.012 0.113 0.312 0.382 0.351 --- --- 0.093 0.301 327 0.381 0.007 0.010 0.114 0.326 0.402 
Fisher 29.02***      29.61**
* 
     26.21***      
Countries                    
Observations  471 471 471 471 471 471 431   431 431 431 402 402 402 402 402 402 
                   
Notes. Dependent variable is Total terrorism. *,**,***, denote significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where the Total terrorism is least. OLS: Ordinary Least 
Squares. Pseudo R²(R²) for Quantile regressions (OLS). na: not applicable because convergence is not achieved. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index. MilitaryE: Military Expenditure. PolSta: Political 
Stability. (-1): non contemporary. (IV): instrumental variable. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Definitions of variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables (Measurement) Sources 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PS 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Domestic 
terrorism 
Domter Number of Domestic terrorism incidents (in Ln)  
 
Ender et al. (2011) 
and 
Gailbulloev et al. 
(2012) 
 
   
Transnational 
terrorism  
Tranter Number of Transnational terrorism incidents (in Ln) 
   
Uuclear terrorism  Unclter Number of terrorism incidents whose category in unclear (in 
Ln) 
   
Total terrorism  Totter Total number of terrorism incidents (in Ln) 
    
Internet   Internet Internet penetration (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inclusive 
development    
IHDI Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index  UNDP 
    
Growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Inflation   Inflation Consumer Price Index (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Military Expense    Milit Military Expenditure  (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  PCA: Principal Component Analysis. UNDP: United Nations 
Development Program. Ln: Natural logarithm.  
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics (1996-2012) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Political Stability -0.550 0.948 -3.220 1.188 742 
Domestic terrorism  0.414 0.892 0.000 6.234 901 
Transnational terrorism 0.221 0.541 0.000 3.332 901 
Unclear terrorism 0.097 0.389 0.000 4.888 901 
Total terrorism 0.540 1.002 0.000 6.300 901 
Internet penetration  4.243 7.773 0.000 55.416 874 
Inclusive development  0.912 4.448 0.127 45.325 687 
GDP growth  5.080 9.317 -62.075 149.973 875 
Inflation   16.586 150.256 -9.797 4145.108 803 
Military Expenditure  2.278 3.034 0.145 39.606 722 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation 
 
Appendix 3: Correlation analysis (uniform sample size: 471) 
           
PS Internet IHDI GDPg Inflation Milit Domter Tranter Unclter Totter  
1.000 0.205 0.028 0.005 -0.191 -0.238 -0.492 -0.492 -0.265 -0.554 PS 
 1.000 0.002 -0.053 -0.057 -0.067 0.076 0.025 0.041 0.053 Internet 
  1.000 -0.045 -0.011 -0.026 0.142 0.036 0.174 0.149 IHDI 
   1.000 -0.143 -0.101 -0.010 0.003 -0.072 -0.016 GDPg 
    1.000 -0.081 0.006 0.146 0.087 0.068 Inflation 
     1.000 0.141 0.081 0.081 0.155 Milit 
      1.000 0.580 0.625 0.957 Domter 
       1.000 0.461 0.743 Tranter 
        1.000 0.664 Unclter 
         1.000 Totter 
           
PS: Political Stability/Non violence. Internet: Internet Penetration. IHDI: Inequality Adjusted Human Development Index.  
GDPg: Gross Domestic Product Growth. Milit: Military Expenditure. Domter: Domestic Terrorism. Tranter: Transnational  
Terrorism. Unclter: Unclear Terrorism. Totter: Total Terrorism.   
 
